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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Supreme Court handed down several important decisions on
criminal procedure.1 Perhaps unanticipated at the time, two of those
decisions have been read together by lower courts to reach dramatically

1. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (holding
that under the Sixth Amendment, laboratory test results are testimonial in nature, and in
order for the results to be admissible into evidence, the analysts who generated them must
testify in court); Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091–92 (2009) (overruling
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), to hold that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is possible if the waiver is knowing and intelligent); Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.
Ct. 1710, 1723 (2009) (holding that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest”); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009)
(expanding the scope of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to encompass
situations where an unlawful search is the result of isolated police negligence).
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different results.2 The emerging split has been sharp, bringing with it
urgent calls for the Court to intervene.3
Laying the foundation for the conflicting decisions was %ew York v.
Belton,4 in which the Supreme Court held that “when a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of the automobile” along with any containers found therein.5
Following that decision, lower courts regularly upheld warrantless searches
of vehicles conducted incident to an arrest after the police had secured the
arrestee away from the target vehicle.6 In 2009, the United States Supreme
Court, in Arizona v. Gant,7 found that these procedures did not comply with
the rationale underlying Belton and declined to adopt the lower courts’
broad interpretations of that decision.8
2. Compare United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the good-faith exception does not apply to reliance on settled case law that is
subsequently ruled unconstitutional while a conviction is on direct appeal), with United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying Herring to find that the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule extends to an officer’s reasonable reliance on
settled case law), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010)
3. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at i, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010)
(No. 09-402) (requesting that the Supreme Court grant certiorari on the question of
“[w]hether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search authorized
by precedent at the time of the search that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional”).
4. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
5. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying
the Belton rule and upholding a warrantless search of an automobile incident to arrest);
United States v. Barnes, 374 F.3d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a warrantless search
incident to arrest of a vehicle is permissible when the arrestee is handcuffed and secured
away from the vehicle); United States v. Wesley, 293 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[W]e
read Belton as creating a bright-line rule that, incident to . . . arrest of the occupant of a
vehicle, the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle without regard to
whether the occupant was removed and secured at the time of the search.”); United States v.
Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a search incident to arrest
where the arrestee was handcuffed in the arresting officer’s patrol car at the time of the
search); United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1994) (validating a warrantless
search of an automobile incident to arrest after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured
in the police officer’s vehicle); United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41, 44 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a warrantless search of the defendant’s car was permissible incident to arrest
even when the defendant was locked in the police vehicle).
7. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
8. Id. at 1719. The Belton decision was premised on the earlier case of Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which allowed police to conduct warrantless searches
incident to arrest of “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary ite[m].” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. The Gant majority declared that the lower
courts’ broad interpretation of Belton ignored this crucial link. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
The Court held that searches of a vehicle incident to arrest are limited to situations where
either the arrestee is “within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search” or the arresting officer has a reasonable belief that evidence related to the crime
of arrest will be found within the vehicle. Id. at 1723–24 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Gant
majority emphasized that it did not expressly overrule Belton, but that the decision had the
practical effect of invalidating the lower courts’ interpretation of that case. See Gant, 129 S.
Ct. at 1722 n.9 (asserting that contrary to the dissent’s accusations, the Court’s decision
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At the time the Supreme Court decided Gant, a number of cases were
pending on direct review before lower courts based on evidence obtained in
compliance with each jurisdiction’s understanding of the Belton rule.9
Because Gant did not require lower courts to mechanically suppress
evidence obtained in reliance on pre-Gant precedent,10 prosecutors
searched for alternative justifications to uphold the admissibility of
evidence collected according to these methods.11 They were able to find
the support for their position in Herring v. United States,12 a decision
handed down by the Supreme Court three months before Gant, which
significantly enlarged the scope of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.13
In Herring, the Supreme Court held that exclusion is an inappropriate
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations caused by the objectively
reasonable actions of law enforcement employees.14 Government lawyers
quickly deployed this new weapon in their battles against suppression
where police officers obtained incriminating evidence in accordance with
pre-Gant precedent.15 Faithfully following the Herring court’s decree that
merely demonstrated a “narrow reading,” rather than an overruling, of Belton); United
States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 n.8 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (observing that Gant
effectively changes how Belton is interpreted).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *1 (D.
Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (determining whether to apply the good-faith exception to a search
conducted pursuant to valid case law at the time of the search later rendered unconstitutional
by the decision in Gant); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811 (S.D. Ohio
2009) (analyzing the claim by a defendant that the search of his automobile incident to
arrest violated the Constitution even though, at the time of the search, the police officers
were relying on valid precedent); Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (discussing whether to
suppress evidence obtained in reliance on precedent that was invalidated by Gant before
trial).
10. See United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Gant did not require suppression of evidence from a search . . .
supported by pre-Gant precedent . . . .”).
11. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(noting that while the government conceded that the search failed the Gant standard, it
argued that the search was nonetheless valid because the police relied on pre-Gant law in
good faith).
12. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009).
13. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1043–45 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that Herring’s rationale supports the conclusion that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable
reliance on the settled case law of a jurisdiction constitutes an exception to the exclusionary
rule), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving to the
Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 413, 417 (2009) (“[In Herring] the
Court issued a sweeping rule that the exclusionary rule never applies if the police violate the
Fourth Amendment in good faith or through negligence.”).
14. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 416.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (arguing
that although the search violated Gant, the evidence obtained should be admitted pursuant to
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule); Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46
(contending that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule justifies admission of the
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Allison, 637 F.
Supp. 2d 657, 669–70 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (arguing that the good-faith exception allows for
unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted at trial when a police officer obtains the
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the exclusionary rule should be used only as a “last resort,”16 government
advocates successfully argued that the good-faith exception should be
extended to include a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on the
settled case law of a jurisdiction that is subsequently invalidated.17 Such
rulings, however, have given rise to a growing conflict among authorities,
resulting in the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.18
This Comment will argue that courts should continue to expand the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to include a law enforcement
officer’s reasonable reliance on the settled case law of the jurisdiction that
is subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Such a ruling would be consistent
with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions addressing the good-faith
exception, and logically follows from their rationale.19 Furthermore,
expanding the scope of the exception would comport with the balancing
test courts are required to undertake when confronted with questions of
exclusion.20 Finally, courts should not be deterred by arguments that the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine precludes
application of the expanded good-faith exception.21 The few courts that
evidence in reasonable reliance on case law).
16. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(2006)).
17. See, e.g., McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044 (explaining that in accordance with the
principles expressed in Herring, “it would be proper . . . to apply the good-faith exception to
a search justified under the settled case law of a United States Court of Appeals, but later
rendered unconstitutional by a Supreme Court decision”); accord United States v. Gray, No.
4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (stating that a police officer’s
reliance on overruled case law does not result in the application of the exclusionary rule);
United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (admitting evidence
obtained by a police officer acting in reliance on pre-Gant precedent because the officer
reasonably relied on the case law and did not act in bad faith); United States v. Lee, No. 0704050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (stating that
officers’ reliance in good-faith on precedent pre-Gant is defensible, even if the search is
unconstitutional post-Gant); United States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL
3112127, at *3–4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009) (explaining that no benefit would be realized by
suppressing evidence obtained by an officer acting in reasonable reliance on settled case law
that was subsequently overturned); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009 WL
2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (holding that a police officer acting in reasonable
reliance on the settled case law of the United States Court of Appeals does not commit
misconduct when that law is later ruled unconstitutional); United States v. Allison, 637 F.
Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“[A] law enforcement officer’s objective, good-faith
reliance on doctrine derived from case law does not warrant application of the exclusionary
rule.”); United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (recognizing
that there is “no deterrent effect to be gained [by applying] the exclusionary rule” in a
situation where a police officer relies on case law that is subsequently invalidated).
18. See supra note 2 (comparing the current uses of the good-faith exception post-Gant
and Herring).
19. See infra Part III.A (discussing how Leon supports expanding the good-faith
exception).
20. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (explaining that the exclusionary rule was designed
to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment, and that for the rule to apply, its
deterrent benefits must outweigh its associated costs).
21. See infra Part III.B (explaining that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine does
not preclude use of the good-faith exception where police officers reasonably rely upon case
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have adopted this approach have misinterpreted the Court’s retroactivity
precedent and many of the arguments they employ are overstated.
Part I of this Comment will examine the historical development of the
good-faith exception through Herring. Part II will discuss the split in
authority that has come about as a result of the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Gant and Herring. Finally, Part III will analyze arguments for and
against broadening the scope of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, ultimately concluding that the good-faith exception
should include a police officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on settled
case law that is subsequently overruled.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment does not contain a textual remedy for the
violations of its dictates.22 Over time, however, the Supreme Court
developed a cogent rule mandating the exclusion of some illegally obtained
evidence from trial.23 Although this rule was initially limited to federal
prosecutions, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule was of
constitutional character, and therefore, must apply in state prosecutions as
well.24
Prominent jurists and commentators argued that the early formulation of
the exclusionary rule swept too broadly.25 Excluding evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment hindered the traditional truth-finding
functions of the courts, and frustrated the judicial system’s goal of
punishing the guilty.26 Many believed that more was required to restrict the
law that has been overruled by the Supreme Court).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
23. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699 (noting that the Court has created a rule that, when
applicable, disallows the admission of “improperly obtained evidence at trial” (citing Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914))). For a detailed account of the history leading
up to the incorporation of the exclusionary rule see generally Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
24. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that any evidence obtained by
unconstitutional searches and seizures is inadmissible in state court).
25. See Paul Simon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule—Judicial
Remedy or Constitutional Mandate: Is There Room for the “Good Faith” Exception?, 41 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1122 (2000) (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 927 (1979), and supporting the proposition that Justice Rehnquist
“would prefer to see the Exclusionary Rule abolished in both state and federal
prosecutions”).
26. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (“The substantial social costs
exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long
been a source of concern.”); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) (“Our cases
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“substantial costs” the exclusionary rule placed on the judicial system
specifically, and on society in general.27 Proponents of limiting the rule’s
applicability eventually found their vehicle in United States v. Leon,28
which established the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.29
A. United States v. Leon30—A Framework for Balancing Deterrence and
Social Costs to Determine When the Exclusionary Rule Applies
In 1981, a confidential informant’s tip led police down an investigative
trail that culminated with a search of Alberto Leon’s residence, where
police seized a large quantity of narcotics.31 In conducting their search, the
police acted pursuant to a facially valid search warrant issued by a state
superior court judge.32 The district court reviewing the case subsequently
invalidated the search because it found that the affidavit supporting the
warrant
was
insufficient
to establish probable cause.33 The government argued that the court should
not suppress the evidence because the officers conducting the search
reasonably relied in good-faith on a judicial determination of probable
cause.34 Although the trial and appellate courts disagreed with this
contention, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and accepted the
government’s argument, establishing the foundation of the modern goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule.35
To support its conclusion, the Supreme Court first had to weaken the
apparent strength of the exclusionary rule as it had been established in
Weeks v. United States36 and Mapp v. Ohio.37 Justice Byron White, writing
have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction . . .
would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.”); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976) (“The disparity in particular cases between the error
committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application
of the [exclusionary] rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the
concept of justice.”).
27. See Simon, supra note 25, at 1126 (noting that the Court “had been trolling for a
case . . . that would substantially eliminate the rights secured under” the cases establishing
the exclusionary rule).
28. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
29. See id. at 922–23 (holding that the exclusionary rule should not apply to
a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on a facially sufficient judicial
determination of probable cause later deemed invalid).
30. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
31. Id. at 901.
32. Id. at 902.
33. Id. at 903.
34. Id. at 904.
35. Id. at 905.
36. 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949) (explaining that
Weeks was the first case to hold that in a federal prosecution, evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded).
37. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment “‘has never been
interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings’”
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for the Court, articulated a new balancing test to determine when the
remedy of exclusion applies.38 The Court explained that exclusion is only
appropriate in cases where, after “weighing the costs and benefits of
preventing the use . . . of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence,” the
benefits of exclusion outweigh “[t]he substantial social costs exacted by the
exclusionary rule.”39 Justice White concluded that the balancing test
strongly implied that the exclusionary rule should be altered to allow for
the admission of evidence acquired on a “reasonable good-faith belief that
a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.”40
Emphasizing that the exclusionary rule was not an individual
constitutional right, the Court explained that the rule applied only when
exclusion was capable of deterring future violations of the Fourth
Amendment.41 Based on this conclusion, the majority highlighted three
reasons why evidence obtained in good-faith reliance on a facially valid
search warrant should not be suppressed.42 First, the purpose of the
exclusionary rule was to respond only to the transgressions of police
officers in an attempt to dissuade them from committing future breaches of
the Fourth Amendment.43 The exclusionary rule was never designed to
punish the mistakes of judicial actors.44 Second, the Court noted that even
if the exclusionary rule was designed to deter judicial actors, it found no
evidence to support the proposition that judicial actors were “inclined to
ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.”45 Finally, Justice White
reasoned that there was no basis “for believing that exclusion of evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant [would] have a significant deterrent effect” on
judicial officers.46 This logic provided the necessary foundation for the
(quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976))). The Leon opinion began by
loosening the exclusionary rule from its perceived constitutional moorings. Id.; see Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states); see also Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (recognizing that federal courts do not have
“supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings” and may only intervene to correct
constitutional violations).
38. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906–07.
39. Id. at 907.
40. Id. at 909 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring)).
41. See id. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
42. Id. at 916. For a strong critique of the Court’s reasoning in Leon, see generally
Simon, supra note 25, at 1126–39.
43. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. The Court explained that a neutral magistrate’s
determination of probable cause is a “more reliable safeguard against improper searches”
than a law enforcement officer’s judgment because judges are not motivated by the same
biases as law enforcement. Id. at 913–14.
44. Id. at 916.
45. Id. This point has stirred controversy. The Court itself cited several studies in
contrast to its position, but disregarded them. Id. at 916 n.14. Commentators have
suggested that this argument “deserves little credence.” Donald Dripps, Living with Leon,
95 YALE L.J. 906, 916 (1986).
46. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.

OKLEWICZ_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

9/3/2010 10:47 AM

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION

1723

Court’s ultimate holding that exclusion is an inappropriate remedy when
evidence is obtained by a police officer who acts in an objectively goodfaith reliance upon a facially valid search warrant that is subsequently
deemed invalid.47
Although the Court cut back dramatically on the scope of the
exclusionary rule,48 the majority was wary of particular circumstances
where exclusion remained an appropriate remedy.49 The Court noted that if
an affiant misleads the judicial officer issuing the warrant by providing
information that the affiant knew or should have known was false, courts
could suppress the evidence obtained from the officer’s reliance on the
defective warrant.50 The majority also declined to extend the exception to
instances where the judicial officer issuing the warrant “wholly abandoned
his judicial role.”51 In addition, the Court found that exclusion would be a
possible when a warrant was based on an affidavit that was so sufficiently
bereft of probable cause that no reasonable officer could be justified in
relying upon it.52 Finally, the Court held that the good-faith exception
applies only to warrants that are valid on their face.53 If, for example, the
warrant fails to meet the standards of particularization required by the
Fourth Amendment, an officer cannot be said to have reasonably relied
upon it, thus necessitating exclusion of the evidence obtained through the
warrant’s issuance.54
47. Id. at 919–22. The Court made several auxiliary arguments to support this
conclusion. Justice White noted that when police act within the scope of a seemingly valid
search warrant, they are not acting illegally. Id. at 921. If a warrant is facially valid, the
police officer’s inquiry into its reasonableness ends because it is not within the province of
executive branch officers to question the judicial officer’s determination of probable cause.
Id. Once a judicial actor issues a valid warrant, “‘there is literally nothing more the
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.’” Id. (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 498 (1976)). From this, the Court determined that holding a police officer
responsible for a judge or magistrate’s mistake could not rationally be expected to prevent
future violations of the Constitution. Id.
48. See Simon, supra note 25, at 1128 (arguing that the Court in Leon effectively
overruled Weeks and Mapp).
49. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
50. Id. at 923. When a defense attorney believes the affiant has intentionally or
recklessly misled an issuing magistrate or judge, the attorney will file a Franks motion in an
attempt to void the search warrant. See generally Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)
(holding that at a defendant’s request, a hearing must be held if there is a “substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included . . . in [the] search warrant affidavit”).
51. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. This is a particularly interesting caveat given the fact that to
support its holding, the majority argued that there was “no evidence” to suggest magistrates
engage in this behavior in the first place. Id. at 916. Regardless of this perceived
inconsistency, this conclusion follows logically from the Court’s reasoning that deterrence is
ineffective against judges and magistrates because they “are not adjuncts to the law
enforcement team.” Id. at 917.
52. Id. at 923. This exception to the Court’s holding appears to be little more than an
example of a judicial officer wholly abandoning his or her judicial role.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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B. Illinois v. Krull55—Applying the Leon Framework to a Law
Enforcement Officer’s Reasonable Reliance on a State Statute that is
Subsequently Declared Unconstitutional
Three years after the Supreme Court decided Leon, it faced the question
of whether to expand the good-faith doctrine to include a police officer’s
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalided state statute.56 In an
attempt to curb the trade in stolen cars, the Illinois state legislature passed a
law requiring people in the business of selling automobiles to obtain a
license from the Illinois Secretary of State.57 The law mandated that these
licensees keep thorough records of any vehicle bought or sold by the
business, including each vehicle’s identification number.58 The statute
provided state officials with authority to review the licensee’s records at
any reasonable time, and allowed officials to inspect the licensee’s place of
business to verify the accuracy of the records.59 Acting pursuant to this
statutory authority, a police officer inspected several cars on Albert Krull’s
lot and determined that a number of them were stolen.60 The officer then
seized the vehicles and arrested Krull.61 The day after the search of Krull’s
property, a federal district court declared the statute on which the officer
relied unconstitutional.62
In analyzing the question, the Supreme Court closely followed its
decision in Leon.63 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, explained
that like judicial officers, legislators are not “adjuncts to the law
enforcement team.”64 Although legislatures pass laws permitting police
officers to act with certain authority, the majority found that there was no

55. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
56. Id. at 346.
57. Id. at 342.
58. Id. at 343.
59. Id. (citing 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-401(e) (1981)) (citing ILL. REV. STAT.,
ch. 95 1/2, ¶ 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1983)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 344 (ruling that the statute granted authorities too much discretion in their
ability to conduct warrantless searches).
63. See George M. Dery, III, Good Enough for Government Work: The Court’s
Dangerous Decision, in Herring v. United States, to Limit the Exclusionary Rule to Only the
Most Culpable Police Behavior, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2009) (observing
that the Krull court “steered so closely to Leon that it simply echoed many of Leon’s
propositions”). An example of this similarity can be found at the outset of the opinion
where the Court reaffirmed the notion that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right,
and should only operate when it can deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment.
Krull, 480 U.S. at 347.
64. Krull, 480 U.S. at 350–51. This claim suggests that since legislators have no stake
in the outcome of criminal prosecutions, deterring evidence in those very proceedings will
have little, if any, deterrent effect to prevent future violations of the Constitution by these
actors. Id. at 351.
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evidence to suggest legislatures knowingly enact statutes to permit
violations of the Constitution they take an oath to uphold.65
Justice Blackmun explained that courts have the ability to invalidate
state legislation when it infringes upon the Constitution, and by doing so,
the courts send a message to the legislature that evidence obtained pursuant
to the invalidated law will no longer be admissible at trial.66 The majority
argued that the “extreme sanction of exclusion” would not operate to deter
potential legislative malfeasance before a court declared the law
unconstitutional.67 Even if exclusion did provide a modicum of deterrence,
when weighed against the substantial costs the remedy imposes on the
judicial system and society, the Court concluded that application of the rule
would be unjustified.68
Like Leon, however, the majority limited the scope of its holding to
situations where the officer’s reliance on the state statute was objectively
reasonable.69 The Court found that if a legislature “wholly abandon[s] its
responsibility to enact constitutional laws,” law enforcement’s reliance on
the defective statute would be unreasonable.70 Furthermore, if the statute
was so egregious that a reasonable officer should have known that it was
unconstitutional on its face, reliance on the statute would not operate to
preclude exclusion.71 Because the statute appeared legitimate when the
officer searched Krull’s property, the Court held that officer’s good-faith
reliance on the law prevented suppression of the evidence obtained against
Krull.72
C. Arizona v. Evans73—Including Reasonable Reliance on the Clerical
Errors of Court Employees Within the Leon Framework
The last of the early good-faith cases was Arizona v. Evans. In January
1991, Isaac Evans was pulled over for driving the wrong way down a one65. Id.
66. Id. at 352. The usual result of invalidating a state statute is that the legislature either
repeals or amends the defective enactment, thus resolving the constitutional discrepancy.
Id.
67. Id. at 351–52. The majority adopted language from Leon, stating that “‘[p]enalizing
the officer for the [legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’” Id. at 350 (quoting United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984)).
68. Id. at 352–53.
69. Id. at 355.
70. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (1984)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 360. The Court appeared to find support for this conclusion, at least in part,
from a passage Justice Blackmun quoted from Leon: “‘[e]xcluding evidence will not further
the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that . . .
the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.
Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less
willing to do his duty.’” Id. at 349 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (1984)).
73. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
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way street.74 After Evans informed the officer that his license had been
suspended, the officer ran a check of Evans’ record.75 The inspection
revealed that Evans had a warrant out for his arrest.76 When the officer
took Evans into custody on the basis of that warrant, a marijuana cigarette
fell out of his possession, prompting the officer to search Evans’ vehicle
where he discovered more marijuana.77
As it turned out, a justice of the peace had quashed the warrant seventeen
days before Evans’ arrest.78 There was no indication, however, that any
court clerk called the sheriff’s office to have the office remove the warrant
from its computer records pursuant to established procedure.79 The Court
was faced with the question of whether exclusion was an appropriate
remedy when evidence was obtained by an officer acting in good-faith
reliance upon computer records, which indicated the existence of an
outstanding arrest warrant for a suspect, when those records were later
discovered to be erroneous.80
Disagreeing with the Arizona Supreme Court, the majority found that
“[a]pplication of the Leon framework support[ed] a categorical exception to
the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees.”81 Assuming
that court employees were responsible for the error, the majority noted that
excluding evidence at trial would not deter similar mistakes by these actors
in the future, in part, because court employees had no interest in the
outcome of individual criminal prosecutions.82 Furthermore, the Court
indicated that the clerk’s mistake in this case was too minor to justify
applying the severe remedy of exclusion.83 Therefore, after finding that the
officer’s reliance on the computer record was objectively reasonable,84 the
Court reversed the lower court’s decision.85
74. Id. at 4. Interestingly, the officer observed Evans’ conduct from his police station,
which was located on the street where Evans was driving. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 3–4.
81. Id. at 16. The Arizona Supreme Court held that while the exclusionary rule may be
inappropriate in circumstances where the magistrate “‘issued a facially valid warrant . . .
based on an erroneous evaluation of the facts, the law, or both,’” invocation of the rule was
“‘useful and proper’” when an unlawful arrest had resulted from “‘negligent record
keeping.’” Id. at 9–10 (quoting State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994)).
82. Id. at 14–15 (explaining that there was nothing to suggest that court employees were
likely to disregard the Fourth Amendment).
83. Id. at 15–16.
84. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the trial court that the officer “would have
been derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest [Evans].” Id. at 15. Therefore, he determined
that there was no indication that the officer’s reliance on the computer record was
unreasonable. Id. at 15–16.
85. Id. at 16.
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D. Herring v. United States86—Focusing on Individual Law Enforcement
Culpability to Determine When the Exclusionary Rule Applies
For fifteen years after Evans, the Supreme Court did not alter the Leon
framework. In Herring v. United States, however, the Court took the
opportunity to expand the scope of the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, moving beyond the core rationale of the Leon line of
cases.87
In 2004, a police officer asked his department’s warrant clerk to check if
there were any warrants out for the arrest of Bennie Dean Herring.88 When
the record search failed to return any outstanding warrants, the officer
asked the clerk to search a neighboring county’s database.89 That county’s
database contained a record indicating that a warrant for Herring’s arrest
was outstanding.90 Acting pursuant to this information, the police officer
stopped Herring and arrested him.91 While conducting a search of
Herring’s vehicle incident to the arrest, the officer found narcotics and an
illegal firearm.92
Shortly thereafter, the warrant clerk received information from the
neighboring county that, in fact, there was no outstanding warrant for
Herring’s arrest.93 The officers eventually discovered that through some
mistake of the neighboring county’s police department, the records
erroneously contained information indicating the existence of the arrest
warrant.94 Although both the government and the defense agreed that the
86. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009).
87. See Id. at 704 (holding that “when police mistakes are the result of negligence . . .
rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal
deterrence” will not be sufficient to warrant exclusion); see also Dery, supra note 63, at 13–
16 (arguing that Leon, Krull, and Evans were all premised on the distinction between the
effect of deterrence on judicial and executive actors). Since the case was decided in January
of 2009, it has been widely criticized. For a particularly blistering attack on the Herring
decision, see generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009),
which categorized Herring as one of the most egregious decisions on search and seizure law
in the Supreme Court’s history.
88. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. The petitioner asserted that the officer was only
interested in arresting Herring because the officer possessed animosity over Herring’s report
that the officer had been involved in the murder of a local youth. Dery, supra note 63, at
16–17.
89. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Roughly ten to fifteen minutes elapsed from the time that the officer discovered
there was an outstanding warrant to the time the warrant clerk was notified that the
information regarding the warrant was incorrect. Id.
94. Id.
The standard procedure was that the other county’s warrant clerk
would keep hard copies of all outstanding warrants. Id. When those warrants were
quashed, the clerk would remove the hard copies and would enter the necessary information
into the police department’s database. Id. The clerk was unable to find the hardcopy of the
warrant, leading her to contact the court clerk who informed her that the warrant had been
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arrest was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the parties disagreed as to
whether the evidence obtained as a result of this violation should be
excluded.95 The Supreme Court was asked whether evidence should be
suppressed when it is obtained as a result of an arrest made in reasonable
reliance on a police department record, when that record is subsequently
determined to be inaccurate due to the negligent actions of law enforcement
personnel.96
Herring began, as did all the previous good-faith cases, by reaffirming
the concept that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right,
but a court created doctrine designed to deter future violations of the Fourth
Amendment.97 The Court emphasized that suppression is an “extreme
sanction” appropriately applied only when the benefits outweigh its
“substantial social costs.”98 Nevertheless, that is where most of the
similarities with the previous good-faith cases ended.99
Rather than analyzing the three factors laid out in Leon to determine
whether exclusion was an appropriate remedy in light of its potential
deterrent effect, the Court chose to focus on the culpability of the warrant
clerk’s conduct to decide if the error required suppression.100 Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, noted that the exclusionary rule came
recalled five months earlier. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that the evidence was admissible under the good-faith
exception because the error on which the arrest was based was “merely negligent and
attenuated from the arrest,” and because the benefits gained from exclusion would be
minimal when compared to the costs. Id.
97. Id. at 699 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974));
see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (stating that the exclusionary rule is a judicial
construct operating as a law enforcement officer deterrent (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at
348)); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (stating that the exclusionary rule’s
purpose is to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement officers (citing
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (affirming
that the exclusionary rule is meant to have a deterrent effect on law enforcement officers
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348)).
98. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 352–53). The Court noted
that the exclusionary rule’s “‘costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives
presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.’” Id. at 701 (quoting Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998)).
99. See Dery, supra note 63, at 21 (noting that “the Herring Court took a dramatic
departure from its past decisions”).
100. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700–01. The first factor mentioned in the previous good-faith
exception cases was that the exclusionary rule was “designed ‘to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.’” Krull, 480 U.S. at 348.
Because police action, rather than executive or judicial action, was at issue in Herring, the
Court would find an immediate conflict with this factor. The second factor these courts
addressed was whether there existed any evidence suggesting the particular actors at issue
were “inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these
actors require[d] application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.” Id. The final factor
analyzed by Leon and its progeny was whether there was a “basis ‘for believing that
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deterrent
effect’” on the particular actor’s behavior. Id. This final factor was of the “greatest
importance” to these courts. Id.
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about as a response to “intentional conduct that was patently
unconstitutional.”101 Under the majority’s view, errors arising from
isolated instances of negligence did not warrant exclusion because they
were not the result of the type of conduct that the rule was designed to
counteract.102 Explaining that an analysis of the flagrancy of law
enforcement malfeasance “constitute[d] an important step in the calculus of
[whether to apply] the exclusionary rule,” the Court stated that “police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price
paid by the justice system.”103 According to the Court, the negligent
conduct of the warrant clerk did not meet this level of culpability.104
Therefore, the Court declined to suppress the evidence.105
The Court limited the scope of its holding by taking note of two
situations that could require exclusion.106 First, if the defendant was able to
demonstrate that the police department either created fictitious records for
the purpose of making otherwise unlawful arrests, or was reckless in
maintaining their record-keeping system, exclusion would be justified.107
Second, the majority noted that suppression may be an appropriate remedy
if the defense could show that the arrest was a result of systemic errors
rather than isolated instances of negligence.108 The Court explained that
reliance on a system that produces widespread errors could not be
objectively reasonable; therefore, the good-faith exception would not
apply.109

101. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702.
102. See id. (asserting that an error resulting from “nonrecurring and attenuated
negligence is . . . far removed from” the concerns that led the Court to adopt the
exclusionary rule).
103. Id. at 701–02.
104. Id. at 703.
105. Id.
106. See id. (discussing exclusion in Franks and Leon). The Court, in both Leon and
Krull, took similar approaches to limiting the scope of the good-faith exception. See Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987) (preventing the good-faith exception from applying to
situations where “the legislature wholly abandon[s] its responsibility to enact constitutional
laws,” or where a law is patently unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923
(1984) (declining to expand the good-faith exception to situations where a judicial officer
“wholly abandons his judicial role,” where an affiant provides information that he knows or
should know is false, where a warrant is so lacking in probable cause to render reliance on it
unreasonable, or where the warrant is facially deficient). The Court in Evans declined to
cabin its holding to only reasonable clerical errors. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16
(1995).
107. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703. This follows from the Court’s reasoning that the
exclusionary rule can only deter sufficiently culpable conduct. Id. at 702.
108. Id. at 704. The majority found support for this contention in Justice O’Connor’s
concurring opinion in Evans, where she stated that “it would not be reasonable for the police
to rely . . . on a recordkeeping system . . . that routinely leads to false arrests.” Id. (citing
Evans, 514 U.S. at 17 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
109. Id. at 703–04.
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After Herring, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule must be
analyzed in two different contexts.110 The Leon line of cases focused on
errors committed by legislative and judicial branch actors, which ultimately
resulted in a violation of the Fourth Amendment.111 In these situations,
courts are required to analyze the three Leon factors to determine whether
the deterrent benefit provided by exclusion outweighs its attendant costs.112
When legislative or judicial actors are at fault, the Supreme Court has
regularly found that they do not.113
Herring, on the other hand, focused on errors committed by law
enforcement officers that ultimately resulted in a constitutional violation.114
When police conduct is at issue, courts must determine the individual
actor’s level of culpability.115 If the police action resulting in the violation
was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, the benefit of deterrence
provided by suppression may outweigh the costs to society, thus justifying
application of the exclusionary rule.116 If, however, the level of culpability
is merely negligent and attenuated from the constitutional violation, the
marginal deterrent benefits provided by exclusion do not justify its
associated costs.117 Following the promulgation of Herring, prosecutors
quickly sought to expand the good-faith exception to include an officer’s
reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is later overruled.118 The
resulting decisions gave rise to a distinct split in the circuits.119
110. See Dery, supra note 62, at 12 (“The cases regarding the good faith exception
before Herring bound themselves to the distinction Leon established between the executive
and judicial branches of government.”).
111. Id.
112. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
113. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995) (expanding the good-faith exception to
include a police officer’s reasonable reliance on the clerical errors of court employees);
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987) (applying the good-faith exception to
instances where a police officer reasonably relies on an apparently valid state statute that is
subsequently ruled unconstitutional); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding that a law enforcement
officer’s good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant issued by a judge or magistrate that
is subsequently found to be deficient does not justify exclusion of the evidence obtained in
compliance with that warrant).
114. See Dery, supra note 63, at 21–22 (noting that the Court focused on the “level of
police impropriety” to conclude that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule varies
depending on the degree to which police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment).
115. Id.
116. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
117. Id. at 704.
118. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting
that while the defendant’s case was on appeal, the Supreme Court handed down Gant, which
prompted the government to raise the good-faith exception argument), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1686 (2010). The decision in Herring was announced on January 14, 2009. 129 S. Ct.
at 695. The Tenth Circuit decided McCane on July 28, 2009. 573 F.3d at 1037. In
McCane, however, the United States first made its good-faith argument on May 4, 2009.
Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 11, United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037,
1040 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-6235).
119. Compare United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule includes a police officer’s reasonable
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: A TREND TOWARD EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF
THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, lower courts grappled with
the question of whether to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a police
officer’s reasonable reliance on the previously settled case law that Gant
overruled.120 The majority of courts decided to expand the good-faith
exception to preclude the suppression of evidence obtained by a police
officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on the settled precedent
invalidated by Gant.121 Other courts, however, chose to read the Supreme
Court’s retroactivity doctrine as prohibiting the admission into evidence of
contraband obtained in violation of the new rule announced in Gant.122
A. The Tenth Circuit Extends the Good-Faith Exception to Include a
Police Officer’s Reasonable Reliance on the Settled Case Law of a
Jurisdiction that is Eventually Invalidated
Before the Supreme Court’s rulings in Gant and Herring, few courts
were willing to expand the good-faith exception to include an officer’s
reasonable reliance on the settled case law of a jurisdiction. In 1987, the
reliance on the well-settled and unequivocal decisions of the Eleventh Circuit), with United
States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine prohibits an expansion of the good-faith
exception).
120. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1262 (noting that the Gant decision had replaced its former
interpretation of Belton); Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133 (asserting that it could not apply the
good-faith exception without creating tension with existing case law); McCane, 573 F.3d at
1039 (holding that, in light of the Gant decision, the district court had erred in finding a
search incident to arrest valid); United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740,
at *5–6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (expressing uncertainty as to whether Leon would apply to
pre-Gant searches); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811–12 (S.D. Ohio
2009) (noting the divide among circuits as to whether Gant should be applied retroactively);
United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo.
Nov. 10, 2009) (asserting that the good-faith exception should apply); United States v.
Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044–45 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that the retroactivity
rule does not apply); United States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL 3112127, at *4
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009) (maintaining that the good-faith exception should apply because
the officer was well-trained and acted reasonably); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr14/RS, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (applying the good-faith
exception because the search was not a result of officer misconduct); United States v.
Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (maintaining that evidence should not
be suppressed because no wrongful conduct on the part of the police officers had occurred);
United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (deciding not to
apply the exclusionary rule because it would not have the effect of deterring future officer
misconduct); United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(declining to extend the good-faith exception to cases of good faith reliance on subsequently
overturned Supreme Court decisions).
121. Davis, 598 F.3d at 1264; McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039; Gray, 2009 WL 4739740, at
*6; McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 812; Lee, 2009 WL 3762404, at *2; Lopez, 2009 WL
3112127, at *4; Owens, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3; Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 672; Grote,
629 F. Supp. at 1206.
122. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133; Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first federal
appellate court to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied to evidence obtained by an officer who reasonably relied on
settled case law that was later overturned.123 When presented with the
question, the Fifth Circuit originally upheld the constitutionality of
warrantless searches at a permanent checkpoint deemed to be the functional
equivalent of the United States’ border with Mexico.124 Later, that same
court reversed its earlier decision, and determined that these searches
violated the Fourth Amendment.125
Rather than exclude the evidence obtained in reliance on the earlier
circuit precedent, the court held that the evidence was admissible pursuant
to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.126 Although this ruling
was novel, the decision failed to gain momentum with other courts and
ultimately did not reach the Supreme Court for review.127 Over twenty
years later, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether to apply the
good-faith exception to an officer’s reasonable reliance on pre-Gant
precedent that was invalidated by the Supreme Court.128
In 2007, Markice McCane was arrested after police determined that he
was driving on a suspended license.129 The arresting officer handcuffed
McCane and placed him in the back of his patrol car.130 Relying on the
controlling precedent of the Tenth Circuit,131 the officer conducted a search
incident to arrest of the passenger compartment of McCane’s automobile,
ultimately finding a loaded handgun.132 McCane, a convicted felon, was
charged with possession of a firearm in violation of federal law.133
123. See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to searches conducted which relied on the
existing case law of the jurisdiction).
124. Id. at 857 (citing United States v. Jackson, 807 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1986)).
125. Id. at 854.
126. Id. at 866. The Fifth Circuit closely followed the Supreme Court’s rationale from
Leon and concluded that suppressing the evidence would fail to advance the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. For example, the Fifth Circuit read the three factors
from Leon as justifying its holding. Id. at 865–66.
127. Id.
128. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1686 (2010).
129. Id. at 1038–39.
130. Id. at 1039.
131. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that when a lawful
arrest is made of an occupant or recent occupant of a vehicle, police may search the
passenger area of that vehicle, and all containers located within, incident to the arrest);
United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Belton
rule applies even when an arrestee is handcuffed and secured away from the scene of the
search).
132. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039.
133. Id. at 1040. McCane was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
This provision states: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
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After the trial court found McCane guilty, he duly appealed his
conviction.134 While the case was pending on direct appeal, the United
States Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, which explicitly prohibited
the police officer’s search in McCane.135 “On facts almost identical” to
those in McCane, the Supreme Court held that an officer may search the
passenger compartment of a suspect’s vehicle incident to arrest so long as
the suspect remains unsecured within the control area of the compartment,
or the officer reasonably believes that evidence associated with the crime of
arrest will be found in the vehicle.136 Although the Supreme Court
affirmed the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its decision in
Gant,137 the Tenth Circuit took a different approach.138
Rather than order the suppression of the evidence obtained from the now
unlawful search of McCane’s vehicle, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
admissibility of the evidence pursuant to the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.139 Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Herring, the court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply in
situations where an officer reasonably relies on the settled case law of a
jurisdiction that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional.140 The court’s
decision broadened the scope of the good-faith exception beyond any
existing Supreme Court precedent.141
To support its conclusion, the court recounted the familiar refrain found
in each of the Supreme Court’s good-faith exception cases that the
exclusionary rule is not an individual constitutional right, and should only
be invoked where its deterrent effects outweigh its social costs.142 After
reviewing the Supreme Court’s good-faith precedent, the court noted that
two common themes have emerged from these decisions: the exclusionary
rule is designed to deter only unreasonable law enforcement conduct, and it
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.
134. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718–19 (2009)).
137. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Arizona). The Supreme Court of Arizona held that because the officer’s search was
unlawful, the evidence obtained from it must be suppressed.
State v. Gant,
162 P.3d 640, 646 (Ariz. 2007).
138. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040.
139. Id. at 1045.
140. See id. at 1042–45 (applying the deterrence rationale used in Herring).
141. See United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue of whether the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies in a situation where a search is “conducted under a then-prevailing
interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling, but rendered unconstitutional by a subsequent
Supreme Court ruling announced while the defendant’s conviction was on direct review”).
142. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042. The court also highlighted both the Leon and Evans
incantations of the three-part test for determining when the exclusionary rule is
appropriately applied. Id. at 1042–43.
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is not intended, nor is it able, to deter the conduct of actors in the judicial or
legislative branches.143
Upon this foundation, the McCane court
determined that application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule was appropriate under the circumstances presented.144
Judge Murphy, writing for the court, analogized the police officer’s
conduct at issue in McCane to the officers’ conduct in Leon, Krull, and
Evans.145 The court found the police officer’s reliance on the settled case
law of the jurisdiction to be no more unreasonable than an officer’s reliance
on a facially valid warrant, an apparently valid state statute, or the clerical
error of a court employee.146 Judge Murphy noted that the exclusionary
rule was not designed to punish the mistakes of judicial officers and that
“no evidence” existed to support the assertion that judicial actors were
likely to violate the Fourth Amendment.147 Therefore, the court reasoned
that there was no basis to believe that suppressing evidence would have a
significant deterrent effect on judges delegated the responsibility of
interpreting the Constitution.148 Consequently, the court declined to
exclude the evidence obtained from the officer’s reasonable reliance on the
established precedent of Tenth Circuit that the Supreme Court later
rendered null.149
Shortly after the Tenth Circuit decided McCane, a clear trend developed
in favor of applying the good-faith exception to law enforcement reliance
on pre-Gant precedent.150 Federal district courts within the Sixth, Eighth,
143. Id. at 1044. The Supreme Court has consistently emphasized limitations on this
point. In Herring, the Court conceded that the exclusionary rule may be appropriate where
law enforcement actors are reckless in maintaining their databases or make false entries for
the purpose of making future arrests. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009).
Similar caveats were emphasized in both Krull and Leon. See supra note 106.
144. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1044–45 (“Relying upon the settled case law of a United States Court of
Appeals certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior.”).
147. Id. at 1045.
148. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984)). The court
similarly argued that because the judicial branch is a neutral body with “no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions,” excluding evidence based on judges’ errors in
interpreting the law would serve no real deterrent purpose. Id.
149. Id.
150. See United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6 (D. Neb.
Dec. 7, 2009) (expanding the good-faith exception to include executive branch reliance on
case law); United States v. McGhee, 672 F. Supp. 2d 804, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2009)
(interpreting the good-faith exception to include reasonable reliance on settled precedent
that is later invalidated); United States v. Lee, No. 07-04050-01-CR-C-NKL, 2009 WL
3762404, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (agreeing with the result in McCane); United
States v. Lopez, No. 6:06-120-DCR, 2009 WL 3112127, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2009)
(holding the good-faith exception includes a law enforcement officer’s objectively
reasonable reliance on settled case law); United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009
WL 2584570, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2009) (finding that the good-faith exception applies
to a search authorized by precedent that is subsequently overruled); United States v. Allison,
637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (ruling that the good-faith exception precludes
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and Eleventh Circuits were confronted with the same issue involving the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, with a majority of these courts reaching
an identical conclusion: the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
encompasses an officer’s reasonable reliance on the settled case law of
those jurisdictions that is subsequently overturned.151 Later, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the Tenth and Fifth Circuits and refused “to apply the
exclusionary rule when the police have reasonably relied on clear and wellsettled precedent.”152 Although the weight of authority clearly favors
extending the good-faith exception to such a situation, several courts have
explicitly declined to do so.153
B. The %inth Circuit Holds that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
Retroactivity Doctrine Prohibits Expansion of the Good-Faith Exception
Addressing the same issue as presented to the Tenth Circuit in McCane,
the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the government’s argument for a broad
interpretation of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.154 In
United States v. Gonzalez, the police conducted a search of Ricardo
Gonzalez’s vehicle incident to arrest based upon circuit precedent that the
Gant decision invalidated.155 Rather than going into a detailed discussion
regarding the government’s argument, the court acknowledged the goodfaith precedent in passing, and ruled that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
doctrine concerning new rules of criminal procedure controlled the
outcome of the case.156

the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a police officer’s reliance on the
jurisdiction’s precedent); United States v. Grote, 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (E.D. Wash.
2009) (holding that the good-faith exception applies to searches conducted pursuant to
settled case law). But see United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050–51 (W.D.
Mich. 2009) (declining to extend application of the good-faith exception to law enforcement
reliance on case law); United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (M.D. Tenn. 2009)
(rejecting the extension of the good-faith exception as anomalous to the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine).
151. See supra note 150 (detailing the subsequent decisions of federal courts after the
Tenth Circuit handed down its ruling in McCane).
152. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the good-faith exception does not apply to an officer’s reliance on settled precedent);
Buford, 623 F. Supp. at 927 (declining to expand the good-faith exception to include an
officer’s reliance on case law).
154. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133. The procedural posture in Gonzalez was quite different
from that in McCane. There, the defendant appealed his conviction, and while the case was
pending before the court, the Supreme Court handed down Gant. McCane, 573 F.3d at
1039. In Gonzalez, the court faced the question after the defendant’s original conviction
was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its opinion in
Gant. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131.
155. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131.
156. Id. at 1132.
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In United States v. Johnson,157 the Supreme Court held that when a new
rule of criminal procedure that interprets the Fourth Amendment is
promulgated, that rule is to be applied to all cases pending on direct review
at the time of the decision.158 The Court found that a failure to apply a new
rule construing the Fourth Amendment to those cases violated three
standards of constitutional law.159 First, drawing arbitrary lines as to when
new rules would apply retroactively conflicts with norms of principled
adjudication.160 Second, the Court found it incomprehensible that a new
rule would be applied purely prospectively with the exception of the one
party whose case was lucky enough to be chosen as the vehicle for the
construction of the new rule.161 Finally, the Court noted that a
discriminating application of new constitutional rules violates the principle
that all similarly situated defendants should be treated equally.162
After explaining the reasoning behind adopting this conception of
retroactivity, the Johnson court left a piece of the pre-existing retroactivity
precedent intact.163 The Court upheld the rule that if a new decision
interpreting the Fourth Amendment constitutes “a clear break with the
past,” then the rule is not retroactive.164 Five years after the ruling in
Johnson, the Supreme Court revisited the question of retroactivity and held
that “even decisions constituting a ‘clear break’ with past precedent have
retroactive application.”165
157. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
158. Id. at 562.
159. Id. at 546–47. Here, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s arguments from his
dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), and his concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
160. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 546.
161. Id. at 546–47. The Court pointed to the different roles the legislative and judicial
branches play in rulemaking. Id. Whereas the legislature makes rules prospective or
retroactive as it sees fit, the judiciary has a duty to interpret the Constitution. Id. at 547. In
fulfilling this duty, if the Court were to allow similar cases to pass without receiving the
same benefit as the one case that operated to create the new rule, then the Court would be
engaging in “an indefensible departure from [the] model of judicial review.” Id. (quoting
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 678–79 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
162. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 547.
163. See id. at 549 (adhering to past doctrine which found that “where the Court has
expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a clear break with the past, it almost
invariably has gone on to find such a newly minted principle nonretroactive”) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). When Johnson was
decided, it was premised on a multi-factor test outlined by cases such as Johnson v. %ew
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, the
Court held that a determination of a new rule’s retroactivity should be made after weighing:
“(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 388 U.S. at 297. When a new rule
constitutes a clear break with the past, it fails the last two Stovall factors, requiring it to be
applied only prospectively. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549–50.
165. United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Griffith v.
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The Gonzalez court argued that if it were to accept the government’s
contention that the good-faith exception applied to reasonable reliance on
case law, the decision would undermine the Supreme Court’s settled
retroactivity precedent.166 Judge Betty Fletcher, author of the Gonzalez
opinion, feared that application of the good-faith exception would
transform the courts from judicial bodies deciding cases and controversies
into de facto legislatures with the authority to announce new rules without
applying them.167 Furthermore, the court contended that adopting the
government’s argument would have the improper effect of treating two
similarly situated defendants in fundamentally different ways.168 Because
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to suppress the
evidence obtained against the defendant in Gant, allowing the conviction
against Gonzalez to stand would conflict with the same principles outlined
in Johnson and its progeny.169 On these grounds, the court ruled that
exclusion of the evidence was required, and Gonzalez’s conviction was
reversed.170
Although several courts have adopted the retroactivity doctrine as a
barrier to extending the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the
majority of courts deciding the issue have rejected such an argument.171 As
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).
166. Id. It is important to note that the Court in Johnson, though decided two years
before Leon created the good-faith exception, addressed an argument similar to that made by
the government in Gonzalez. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 559–60. There, the government argued
that since the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the
Fourth Amendment by law enforcement officers, the “evidence obtained from a search
should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had [or should
have had] knowledge . . . that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 559. The Court responded by stating that this argument renders the
retroactivity test the government proposes absurd, because the only “Fourth Amendment
rulings worthy of retroactive application [would be] those in which the arresting officers
violated pre-existing guidelines clearly established by prior cases.” Id. at 560. The Court
noted that cases dealing with violations of pre-existing Fourth Amendment rules do not raise
questions of retroactivity. Id. Therefore, the government’s argument would “automatically
eliminate all Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application.” Id.
167. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1131, 1132. This very fear was one of the reasons the for the
Court’s decision in Johnson. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132. In Johnson, the Supreme Court created the
retroactivity rule in an effort to prevent this very outcome. 457 U.S. at 546.
169. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132–33.
170. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132–33. At least one federal district court has reached the
same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Buford, 623 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927
(M.D. Tenn. 2009). In Buford, the court’s decision turned on the inconsistent outcomes that
would result for similarly situated defendants if the good-faith exception were expanded.
Id. at 926–27 (citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323). The court cautiously noted that the
“Supreme Court has not indicated that the good faith exception should be extended into the
realm of Supreme Court jurisprudence . . . [which is generally] protected by the retroactivity
doctrine,” and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. at 926 (internal quotations
omitted).
171. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (rejecting the retroactivity argument, and finding that the law
created by Gant applies, but that it is a separate question from what remedy, if any, the
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Part III will demonstrate, not only does the framework for the good-faith
exception operate in favor of its expansion to include a law enforcement
officer’s reasonable reliance on settled precedent, the argument that
retroactivity requires the suppression of evidence is lacking.172 Therefore,
courts should continue to follow the rationale of the good-faith doctrine and
apply the exception to an officer’s reasonable reliance on settled case law
that is later overturned.
III. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD
BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER’S
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE RELIANCE ON WELL-SETTLED PRECEDENT
THAT IS LATER OVERRULED
In its current form, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
renders suppression inappropriate when an officer acts in reasonable
reliance on a facially valid search warrant,173 on a state statute that is
or
on
the
negligent
subsequently
invalidated,174
clerical errors of judicial175 or executive branch actors.176 Although the
rationale supporting these decisions is equally applicable to a police
officer’s reasonable reliance on judicial precedent that is later overruled,
some argue that the good-faith exception should not be interpreted so
expansively.177 This section will respond to those arguments.

courts
are
required
to
apply);
accord
United
States
v.
Peoples,
668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (ruling that the retroactivity rules do not
preclude consideration of the good-faith doctrine); see also United States v. Gray, No.
4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *5–6 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (agreeing with the Tenth
Circuit’s ruling that the retroactivity doctrine does not preclude arguments regarding
application of the good-faith exception).
172. See infra Part III.
173. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913–14 (1984).
174. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987) (noting that applying the
exclusionary rule to evidence seized in reliance on an unconstitutional state statute would
not serve as an additional deterrent).
175. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (creating an exception to the
exclusionary rule for clerical errors of court employees).
176. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (holding that police
negligence does not trigger the exclusion of evidence).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2010)
(reviewing the rationale of the good-faith exception and applying it to reasonable law
enforcement reliance on settled precedent later deemed unconstitutional).
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A. The Leon Framework Supports an Expansion of the Good-Faith
Exception
1. The exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy because it cannot
deter future violations of the Constitution
Including a police officer’s reasonable reliance on settled case law in the
good-faith exception fits within the framework created by Leon.178 Under
Leon and its progeny, trial courts are required to employ a balancing test
that weighs the costs and benefits of exclusion before suppressing
evidence.179 When conducting this analysis, courts must determine whether
excluding the evidence at trial will deter the actors responsible for the
constitutional violation from committing future infractions.180
The
Supreme Court has consistently held that when this goal is not met,
application of the exclusionary rule is unwarranted.181
Where police officers rely on the settled case law of an appellate court
that is subsequently invalidated, the exclusionary rule does not achieve its
desired ends of deterring future constitutional violations.182
This
conclusion weighs in favor of an inclusive interpretation of the good-faith
exception.183 One prominent commentator, however, argues that the goodfaith exception should not abrogate the exclusionary rule in cases where
police reasonably relied on settled case law, asserting that the exclusion of
such evidence would deter appellate judges from authorizing constitutional
violations in future rulings.184 This argument turns on dicta from Danforth
v. Minnesota,185 which explained that when the Supreme Court announces a
new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, that rule pre-exists the
Court’s decision in dormancy.186 Therefore, whenever an appellate court
178. See supra Part I.A (detailing the contours of the Leon framework).
179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984).
180. See id. at 916 (employing a three step syllogism to reach the conclusion that the
exclusionary rule would not deter magistrates from authorizing future violations of the
Constitution).
181. See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully
deter it . . . .”).
182. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule where officers act in
objectively reasonable reliance on settled circuit case law).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding
support for its holding that the good-faith exception applies to reliance on settled case law
later invalidated because the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate remedy for deterring
judicial actors); McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044 (highlighting the inability of the exclusionary
rule to deter judicial actors).
184. Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ 2010/03/08/thegood-faith-exception-and-changing-law-distinguishing-illinois-v-krull/ (Mar. 8, 2010, 21:03
EST).
185. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
186. Id. at 271.
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authorizes a holding contrary to that latent rule, the court actually
contravenes the Constitution.187 This argument, though nuanced, is at odds
with the Court’s prevailing conception of the exclusionary rule.188
The exclusionary rule is intended to deter future violations of
the Constitution committed by law enforcement authorities.189 As
interested parties to individual criminal prosecutions, the exclusionary rule
prevents police from committing these violations by sending a clear
message that their course of action did not comply with the law.190 One of
the enduring principles of the good-faith exception cases, however, is that
the exclusionary rule was never intended to deter judicial conduct.191
Judicial actors are neutral parties with no individual stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions.192 Therefore, excluding evidence at trial
obtained by a police officer acting in reasonable reliance on the decisions
of these actors cannot legitimately be expected to deter them from
authorizing future violations of the Constitution.193
Furthermore, Herring reads a scienter requirement into the conduct that
triggers operation of the exclusionary rule.194 Chief Justice Roberts noted
that only when police misconduct is deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent can the exclusionary rule act as an effective deterrent.195 The
argument that exclusion would deter judges from authorizing future
constitutional violations necessarily assumes that judges deliberately or
recklessly reach their unconstitutional conclusions.196 Yet, there exists “no
187. See Posting of Orin Kerr, supra note 184 (“When the Supreme Court announces
that the circuit courts have been getting the law wrong for a few decades, that means . . . the
lower courts were consistently and repeatedly authorizing constitutional violations.”). This
argument also supports the contention that the constitutional error lies with the court that
passed down a judgment that is later overruled, rather than the police officer who relied on
the defective ruling.
188. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (reviewing the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rule and emphasizing that the rule does not deter
judicial actors).
189. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
190. Cf. Harry M. Caldwell & Carol A. Chase, The Unruly Exclusionary Rule: Heeding
Justice Blackmun’s Call to Examine the Rule in Light of Changing Judicial Understanding
About Its Effects Outside the Courtroom, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 45, 54 (1994) (explaining that
the exclusionary rule can only influence police behavior if the police are aware that the
evidence was suppressed and the reasons for doing so).
191. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 n.15 (“[The exclusionary rule is] not well tailored to
deterring judicial misconduct.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725, 735
(1982))).
192. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S. Ct. 1686 (2010).
193. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917.
194. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
195. Id. The Court looks at the officer’s conduct objectively to determine whether it was
sufficiently deliberate or reckless to warrant application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 703.
196. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
exclusionary rule, in part, aims to deter police misconduct); cf. United States v. Allison, 637
F. Supp. 2d 657, 673 n.8 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Krull,
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evidence” to suggest that judicial actors are inclined to subvert the Fourth
Amendment or the rule of law.197 Of course, courts can render erroneous
judgments, but the appropriate way to inform these courts of their mistakes
and to deter them from authorizing future violations of the law is by
reversing their decisions on review, not by suppressing evidence obtained
in reliance on their judgments at trial.198 The Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that the rule’s applicability is limited to those
areas where its “remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.”199 But, without culpable conduct on the part of the judiciary, the
exclusionary rule cannot serve its deterrent purpose.200 Consequently,
application of the exclusionary rule to judicial conduct is inappropriate.201
Additionally, the police do not commit a culpable act capable of being
deterred by the exclusionary rule when they reasonably rely on the settled
precedent of an appellate court that is later overturned.202 The duty of the
judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and various statutes to determine
what the law is.203 When an appellate court issues an apparently valid
ruling
on
a
question
of
law,
that
decision generally obligates police to comply with it.204 By adhering to
that court’s decision, the police commit no deliberate or
reckless constitutional violation.205 Instead, they engage in objectively
480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987)) (reading the Supreme Court’s decisions in Leon and Krull to find
that exclusion might be justified in a case where a judge “wholly abandoned” his or her
judicial role because an officer’s reliance on that particular decision may not be reasonable).
This caveat to the good-faith exception, however, appears to have more value in theory than
in practice.
197. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
198. Cf. id. at 918 n.18 (explaining that closer judicial supervision of magistrates
“provides a more effective remedy than the exclusionary rule”).
199. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 11 (1995) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 908).
200. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (claiming that conduct must be sufficiently
blameworthy before suppression could significantly deter it).
201. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908.
202. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (asserting that the
exclusionary rule cannot meaningfully deter police officers from relying on the well-settled
and unambiguous precedent of the appellate court).
203. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.”).
204. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1987) (noting that police officers have
the responsibility to enforce statutes as they are written). If this were not the case, there
would be no need for the exclusionary rule in the first place because the primary purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment by law
enforcement officers. Id. at 347. Moreover, police are invested with a significant amount of
discretion
when
making
decisions
on
whether
to
arrest or detain an individual. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, 6 (2007). The obligation to act in accordance with the law arises
when the police officers take such action, not when they employ their discretion and refrain
from acting. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s assertion in
Davis that a police officer’s reliance on an ambiguous rule is dangerous).
205. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1265–66 (declaring that police actions that comport with a
reviewing court’s mistaken interpretation of law cannot be considered culpable conduct
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reasonable activity that the good-faith exception was designed to protect.206
The constitutional error that arises when the case is later invalidated rests
solely with the court that promulgated the erroneous decision, not with the
police officer who reasonably relied upon it.207 To hold a blameless law
enforcement officer accountable for the mistakes of the judiciary does not
further the intent of the exclusionary rule, further indicating that its
operation is unjustified.208
Moreover, the benefits of deterrence do not outweigh the costs
associated with the suppression of evidence when a police officer
reasonably relies on established precedent that is subsequently overruled.209
As described above, the particular circumstances of this situation
undermine the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule; however, the
costs associated with suppression remain.210 One of the early justifications
of the exclusionary rule was that it would preserve judicial integrity by
refusing to allow courts to sanction unlawful government behavior.211 By
contrast, a rule that would reject application of the good-faith exception in
this context would serve to punish the government even though it did not
commit a culpable act.212 Instead of maintaining the public’s faith in the
because police officers are entitled to rely on appellate court precedent).
206. Id. at 1265; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (stating that an officer’s reliance on settled case law
“certainly qualifies as objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior”).
207. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (declaring that suppressing
evidence obtained by an officer acting in reliance on a judicial officer’s determination of
probable cause would penalize the police officer for mistakes attributable only to the
judicial actor issuing the warrant); see also Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267 (explaining that when a
court hands down a judgment that is later invalidated, it is the court promulgating that
decision that makes the mistake of law, not the police who reasonably relied on it); McCane,
573 F.3d at 1044 (contending that police officers commit no misconduct when they rely on
the settled case law of a jurisdiction that is subsequently invalidated to effectuate a search).
208. See McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044–45 n.5 (“The lack of deterrence likely to result from
excluding evidence from searches done in good-faith reliance upon settled circuit precedent
indicates the good-faith exception should apply in this context.”). Suppressing evidence that
is obtained through objectively reasonable law enforcement conduct cannot be expected to
deter future violations. Id. at 1042.
209. E.g., United States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR3089, 2009 WL 4739740, at *6–7
(D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2009) (explaining the cost-benefit rationale of the exclusionary rule and
holding that the good-faith exception applies to an officer’s reasonable reliance on
subsequently nullified case law).
210. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that the rationale of the exclusionary rule does not
support its application in the context of police officer reliance on subsequently abrogated
precedent). One example of a cost associated with suppression is the interference with the
courts’ truth-finding function. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907–08.
211. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of the Costs and
Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) (explaining that
the Warren Court’s understanding of the exclusionary rule was informed, in part, by its fear
that admitting illegally obtained evidence would undermine the integrity of the courts). This
rationale was largely renounced by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), which focused almost exclusively on the deterrent
effect of exclusion. Oliver, supra, at 212.
212. See supra notes 202–208 and accompanying text. It is unreasonable to expect the
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courts, suppression would jeopardize the integrity of the criminal justice
system by allowing otherwise guilty defendants go free without securing
any benefit in return.213 Courts should avoid such a deleterious result by
reading the good-faith exception to include a law enforcement officer’s
objectively reasonable reliance on settled case law that is later reversed.
Here, not only do the costs of suppression outweigh the benefits of
deterrence, but the deterrent effects that support the application of the
exclusionary rule are entirely absent.214 If a court were to hold that the
exclusionary rule applied in this situation, it would do so in opposition to
clear and long-standing Supreme Court precedent regarding the function
and operation of the exclusionary rule.215 Therefore, lower courts should
follow this precedent and permit an expanded interpretation of the goodfaith exception.
2.

Defining the scope of the expanded good-faith exception
As described above, the rationale supporting the exclusionary rule
supports a broad interpretation of the good-faith exception; however, this
should not be understood to include all reliance on case law promulgated
within a particular jurisdiction.216 In order for the good-faith doctrine to
preclude
the
exclusion
of
evidence
at
trial,
law enforcement reliance must be objectively reasonable.217 Consistent
with the Supreme Court’s rulings in Leon and beyond, certain limits must
be placed on the applicability of the good-faith exception, thus allowing
operation of the exclusionary rule when its benefits outweigh its costs.218
There are at least three situations where exclusion would remain a viable
remedy. First, the government may not invoke the good-faith doctrine to
admit evidence obtained from a police officer’s reliance on a judicial

police to question or ignore the apparently valid constitutional decisions of a court for doing
so may, in itself, violate the Constitution. See H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s
Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
527, 532 (1999) (arguing that the executive branch is constitutionally obligated to act in
accordance with the limits imposed upon it by Supreme Court decisions).
213. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009) (denouncing the fact that
the exclusionary rule “let[s] guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free”).
214. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that the exclusionary rule cannot deter future
constitutional violations).
215. See generally Leon, 468 U.S. at 905–08, 916–18, 922–25 (recounting the history
and purpose of the exclusionary rule and developing the foundation of the good-faith
exception).
216. Cf. id. at 914–15 (prohibiting application of the good-faith exception in situations
where an officer’s reliance on a warrant could not be deemed to have been objectively
reasonable).
217. Id. at 922 (emphasizing that an officer’s reliance on a facially valid warrant “must
be objectively reasonable”).
218. See supra note 106 (discussing the manner in which Leon and Krull limited the
scope of the good-faith exception).
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decision that is patently unconstitutional.219 In these situations, police
officers cannot be said to have been reasonable in their reliance on the
rulings because the officers knew or should have known that the ruling was
invalid.220 Second, and more importantly, the good-faith exception should
only be extended to include an officer’s reasonable reliance on an appellate
court’s well-settled decisions that constitute mandatory authority.221 If a
court’s decision has not been finalized, or the state of law remains in flux,
reliance on its conclusions may be unreasonable.222 Finally, a police
officer’s reliance must be on a decision that is unequivocal.223 When a
court promulgates a clear and well-defined rule, a police officer’s reliance
upon it would be equivalent to relying on a statute that is subsequently
declared unconstitutional.224 If the rule is ambiguous or undefined, a police
officer’s reliance upon it may be unreasonable.225 The good-faith exception
was designed, in part, to allow law enforcement officers to act “without
219. See United States v. Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 672 n.8 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“A
law enforcement officer cannot be said to have relied in good faith upon case law which
abandons adherence to precedent and/or the applicable text such that it reaches a result ‘that
a reasonable officer should have known was unconstitutional.’” (quoting Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987))); cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (prohibiting the application of the
good-faith exception where an officer relies on a state statute that a “reasonable officer
should have known . . . was unconstitutional”). It is difficult to imagine a situation where a
court
would
enter
a
judgment
that obviously violates the Constitution. Cf. Krull, 480 U.S. at 369 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (doubting the authenticity of the Court’s exception to the good-faith exception
for situations where a legislature “wholly abandon[s] its obligation to pass constitutional
laws”). In reality, there is no evidence to suggest that federal appellate judges are likely to
disregard the Constitution. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916. But, the importance of the exception lies
in the fact that it provides reviewing courts the opportunity to suppress evidence in cases of
extreme judicial abuse without simultaneously reducing the scope of the good-faith doctrine.
220. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (explaining that a state statute that is per se
unconstitutional cannot be reasonably relied upon because police officers should have
known that it was invalid). When Leon established the good-faith doctrine, it required
reliance to be objectively reasonable. 468 U.S. at 919 n.20. By creating this standard, the
Leon court intimated that any time an analysis is conducted regarding an officer’s
reasonableness, the court “must charge the officer with a certain minimum level of
knowledge of the law’s requirements.” United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir.
1985).
221. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (indicating that
the exclusionary rule remains a valid remedy when police rely on novel case law, because
doing so requires an interested officer to engage in the type of legal analysis that is reserved
for neutral judicial officers).
222. See id. at 1266 (asserting that the good-faith exception applies to reasonable
reliance on “well-settled” case law). For example, the good-faith doctrine might not apply
when a police officer relies on the dictates of a trial court addressing a novel question of law
that has not been thoroughly vetted on appeal. In this situation, the law would not be wellsettled, therefore an officer’s reliance on it would be unreasonable for the purposes of the
good-faith exception.
223. See id. (“[O]ur precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before we will
suspend the exclusionary rule’s operation.”).
224. Id. at 1267–68 (citing Krull, 480 U.S. at 340).
225. See id. at 1266–67 (explaining that the clarity of the rule is necessary to the goodfaith analysis because without it, police officers might have the incentive to rely on the
unsettled nature of a Fourth Amendment question to the detriment of the Constitution).
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having to engage in the interpretive activities generally reserved to the
courts.”226 For police to rely on an ambiguous rule, however, they might
have to undertake a level of legal analysis that the good-faith exception
explicitly attempts to eliminate.227
These exceptions to the operation of the good-faith doctrine not only
comport with Supreme Court precedent, but they also provide strong
incentives for police officers to follow the law.228 In United States v.
Peoples,229 a federal district court refused to expand the good-faith
exception to include reasonable reliance on settled case law.230 The court’s
holding was based upon the concern that expanding the good-faith
exception would allow a police officer to make a unilateral determination
as to whether his or her actions were in compliance with the Constitution
when conducting a search or seizure.231 The court feared that extending the
exception would allow police to conduct illegal searches so long as they
were able to cite a case from which they could reasonably conclude that
their actions were justified.232 The court found that this result would soon
render the exclusionary rule defunct because the exception would apply
“whenever an officer could establish good-faith on most any basis.”233
The opinion in Peoples voiced serious concerns about an expanded view
of the good-faith exception.234 Its criticism, however, is excessive. A
good-faith doctrine that includes reasonable reliance on the well-settled and
unequivocal decisions of an appellate court will create an incentive for
police to follow that court’s dictates rather than engage in the troublesome

226. United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1049 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
227. Id.; see Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267 (emphasizing that an analysis of the ambiguity of a
rule promulgated by an appellate court is essential to the determination of whether the
officer satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the good-faith exception).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984) (preventing the
extension of the good-faith exception to situations where reliance is unreasonable, including
when a police officer claims to rely on a warrant that is facially deficient).
229. 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
230. Id. at 1050–51. The court looked to the Seventh Circuit, which had previously been
confronted with the question of whether the good-faith exception included an officer’s
reliance on precedent later overturned by the Supreme Court. United States v. 15324 Cnty
Highway E., 332 F.3d 1070, 1074 (7th Cir. 2003). The court declined to extend the
exception, reasoning that such an expansion would have “undesirable [and] unintended
consequences.” Id. at 1076. Although the court did not extensively elaborate on this
conclusion, the opinion noted that a contrary ruling would encourage law enforcement
officers to engage in activities, such as legal analysis and research, that are better left to
members of the judiciary. Id. Citing this vague language, the federal district court in
Peoples attempted to clarify the purported consequences of expanding the good-faith
exception to include reasonable reliance on judicial precedent. 668 F. Supp. 2d. at 1047–50.
231. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
232. Id. at 1050.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1047–48.
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types of legal analysis as described in Peoples.235 It will also encourage
police officers to adhere to the rule of law.
Under an inclusive good-faith doctrine, when police officers follow the
unambiguous and firmly-rooted decision of an appellate court, they gain
the benefit of having any evidence obtained in reliance on that decision
admitted at trial, even if that case is later reversed.236 Because police
officers are concerned with the outcome of individual criminal
prosecutions, they have an interest in seeing incriminating evidence
admitted at trial.237 This negates any impulse that police may have to rely
on their own conceptions of the law to inform their actions. If the
government can demonstrate that the officer’s reliance was objectively
reasonable, then the evidence will be admitted.238 On the other hand, if the
police decide to stray from established precedent and undertake actions
based on their own view of the law, a trial judge analyzing the good-faith
exception is more likely to exclude any improperly obtained evidence.239
The judge is likely to exclude the evidence because the good-faith
exception does not include a police officer’s unilateral mistake of law.240

235. See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 at 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2010) (asserting
that a police officer’s mistake of law is not objectively reasonable, and thus does not fit
within the good-faith exception). When police officers rely on a case that is subsequently
overturned, the mistake is attributable to the court, not to the police officers acting in
reliance on a court’s decision. Id. at 1267–68.
236. See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (affirming the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence obtained by a police officer who reasonably relied on pre-Gant precedent). Even
where precedent has not been thoroughly vetted, an expanded good-faith exception provides
law enforcement with an incentive to adhere to the law. In this situation, the potential
benefit that accompanies reliance outweighs the risk associated with a police officer’s
decision to ignore or individually interpret its requirements. Trial courts bound by the
newly announced appellate decision are likely to find that a police officer’s adherence to its
dictates is reasonable. Of course, the defense would be able to argue the contrary position,
but this is ultimately a question for the courts to decide given the particular circumstances
surrounding the police officer’s actions. It is clear, however, that an officer who, because of
the
law’s relative temporal disposition, departs from its commands or attaches an unreasonable
interpretation to it runs a higher risk of mistake, thus nullifying the operation of the goodfaith exception. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (explaining that an expanded
good-faith exception would discourage police from relying on their own interpretation of
law).
237. Cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983) (explaining that a judicial
determination of probable cause is preferred to the judgment of a police officer “engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” (quoting Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948))).
238. See Davis, 598 F.3d at 1267–68 (declining to suppress evidence obtained by a
police officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on established precedent).
239. See supra notes 222, 235 (finding that a court would be more likely to exclude
evidence if an officer relies on law that is not well-settled or if the officer relies on his or her
own biased conception of the law).
240. See supra note 235 (excluding an officer’s mistake of law because it is not
objectively reasonable).
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Paradoxically, the court’s holding in Peoples may foster the very
behavior that it attempts to prohibit.241 Rather than barring the police from
interjecting their biased interpretations of the law in an attempt to justify
their actions, the holding in Peoples encourages it.242 The Peoples decision
communicates the message that police cannot trust judicial precedent to
instruct them on how to comply with the law. Without this assurance,
police will naturally question the disposition of every decision announced
by the courts within their jurisdiction.243 In so doing, they may interpose
their own self-interested understanding of what the Constitution permits
them to do.244 Instead of creating an incentive for police “to err on the side
of constitutional behavior,” this rule encourages police to develop their
own interpretations of the law beyond what the courts dictate.245 But,
police are not in a position to determine independently what the law
requires, nor are they able to foresee any potential change in the law that
would justify their disregard of settled precedent.246 A rule that provokes
police to rely on their own perception of the law invites constitutional
violations, and that is a danger courts must avoid.247
Throughout the development of the good-faith exception, the Supreme
Court has restricted the scope of the exception to law enforcement conduct
that is objectively reasonable.248 Limiting a police officer’s reasonable
reliance on case law to the well-settled and unambiguous decisions of an
appellate court of that jurisdiction complies with this general
requirement.249 This formulation of the good-faith exception refrains from
swallowing the exclusionary rule by providing defendants the opportunity
to litigate the question of whether an officer’s reliance was objectively
reasonable.250 It also discourages police from engaging in potentially
241. Cf. United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(“Extending Leon good-faith to include reliance on court precedent . . . involves an
interpretive step on the part of the police that is totally absent from and unjustified by any
previous Supreme Court application of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule”).
242. Cf. id. (arguing that “[e]xtending the good-faith exception to cover an officer’s
good-faith interpretation of case law would in short order become functionally
indistinguishable from an exception that applied whenever an officer could establish good
faith on most any basis”).
243. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (concluding that a police
officer “cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination”);
United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that the officer must be
provided with knowledge of the law’s requirements).
247. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 561.
248. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting that the objectively reasonable
standard assumes the officer has some minimum level of knowledge of the law’s
requirements).
249. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text (listing examples of cases holding
that an officer’s reliance on well-settled case law is objectively reasonable).
250. Contra United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
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abusive behavior because this formulation of the good-faith exception
motivates them to comply with the law as announced by the courts of
review within their jurisdiction.251 When these benefits provided by the
good-faith exception are combined with the substantial costs associated
with exclusion of evidence at trial, it is clear that the rationale underlying
the Supreme Court’s good-faith exception supports an expanded
interpretation of that doctrine.252
B. The Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Does %ot Preclude
Application of the Good-Faith Exception to a Police Officer’s Reasonable
Reliance on the Established Precedent of an Appellate Court that is
Subsequently Overturned
The strongest opposition to the expanded good-faith exception comes
from courts that have interpreted the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
retroactivity doctrine to prohibit such an expansion.253 The Supreme Court
laid out this doctrine in United States v. Johnson254 and Griffith v.
Kentucky.255 In these decisions, the Court concluded that it must apply all
new rules of constitutional criminal procedure to each case pending direct
(arguing that police officers would inevitably be able to find a case on which they could
claim they reasonably relied, rendering the exclusionary rule null).
251. See supra notes 236–237 and accompanying text (arguing that officers will follow
settled case law because they have an interest in seeing incriminating evidence admitted at
trial and relying on case law makes admission more likely).
252. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that suppressing evidence obtained by police
officers acting in reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is later reversed fails the
cost-benefit analysis required by Leon because it does not advance the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule).
253. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. This section assumes that Gant created
a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure capable of being given retroactive effect.
One could argue that Gant merely clarified the rationale of Belton instead of promulgating a
new rule that could be applied retroactively. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1726
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion refused to explicitly overrule
Belton). But, there is no clear authority that suggests this is the appropriate analysis.
254. 457 U.S. 537, 547–49 (1982) (applying a balancing test to hold that new rules of
criminal procedure apply to cases pending on direct review unless they are a clear break
from past decisions).
255. 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (employing a bright-line rule that all new rules of
criminal procedure regarding the Fourth Amendment apply to cases pending on direct
review,
regardless
of
whether
they
represent
a
clear
break
from
past precedent). It is important to note that there is a key distinction between Johnson and
Griffith. United States v. Gonzalez (Gonzalez II), 598 F.3d 1095, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Bea, J., dissenting), denying reh’g, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). Johnson dealt with the
retroactive effect of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Griffith, on the other hand, dealt with the retroactive effect of the Court’s decision in Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which addressed a question of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gonzales, 598 F.3d at 1109 (Bea, J., dissenting). The rights given retroactive
effect under these decisions are different as well. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment decision
addressed
in
Griffith
dealt
with
the personal rights of every criminal defendant. Id. The Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule, however, is not an individual right, but a “societal right” focused on influencing the
behavior of law enforcement authorities. Id. at 1108–09.
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review concerning the same issue.256 Although this precedent is longsettled and well-reasoned, the courts holding that this doctrine precludes
the extension of the good-faith exception are mistaken.
Opponents of a permissive good-faith exception argue that it would
effectively overturn the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine.257 To reach
this conclusion, however, requires a strained reading of that line of cases.
In dealing with the particular dilemma of whether to apply the good-faith
exception to law enforcement’s reliance on pre-Gant searches, the
retroactivity doctrine requires only that lower federal courts apply the rule
of Fourth Amendment law elucidated in Gant.258 Although the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding,
which suppressed evidence obtained in violation of the newly promulgated
rule in Gant, such an affirmation does not make the entire holding of the
Arizona Supreme Court the law as dictated by the United States Supreme
Court.259 Rather, the United States Supreme Court’s “holding is limited to
the questions on which it granted certiorari.”260 The Court in Gant only
considered whether the search of the defendant’s vehicle was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.261 Under that authority, cases pending on direct
review enjoy the benefit of the Gant decision only to the extent that the
searches conducted in reliance on pre-Gant precedent are now deemed
unconstitutional.262 However, the lower courts must still determine
whether exclusion is the proper remedy to apply when they are faced with
these violations.263 In this situation, courts must look to the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the exclusionary rule for guidance.264
The Court in Herring reaffirmed the rationale underlying
the earlier good-faith exception cases.265 As outlined above, this reasoning
256. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
257. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686
(2010) (No. 09-402).
258. Accord United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(asserting that Gant “must undoubtedly apply to all cases pending on direct review” (citing
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328)); see United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting
Illinois v. Gates, 426 U.S. 213, 223 (1983)) (asserting that the question of whether the
exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction to apply in any given case is a wholly distinct
question from whether the Fourth Amendment rights of an individual seeking to invoke the
rule has been violated); see also United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 n.5
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
retroactivity doctrine applies the Court’s rule from Gant to the case pending on direct
review, but the question of remedy remains open for interpretation).
259. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46.
260. Id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a)).
261. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (affirming the Arizona Supreme
Court’s suppression of evidence obtained in reliance on pre-Gant case law).
262. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044–45 n.5.
263. Id.
264. See generally Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699–701 (2009) (discussing
the rationale for the application of the exclusionary rule).
265. Id.

OKLEWICZ_OFF_TO_PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1750

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/3/2010 10:47 AM

[Vol. 59:1715

weighs heavily in favor of extending the good-faith exception to include
executive branch reliance on settled case law.266 Because this is the
appropriate method of adjudicating cases under the Court’s retroactivity
doctrine, those courts that have applied the good-faith exception are correct
in doing so.267 Rather than operating as a barrier to analyzing the
applicability of the exclusionary rule, the retroactivity doctrine forces
courts to address this very question.268 This result leads to the conclusion
that, under the Supreme Court’s current formulation of the exclusionary
rule, the good-faith exception should be expanded to include an officer’s
reasonable reliance on firmly-established appellate court precedent.269
The historical connection between the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
doctrine and its good-faith exception helps illustrate the fact that it is not
necessary to read the two lines of authority to conflicting ends. The
retroactivity doctrine was developed during the same period in which the
Supreme Court first articulated the good-faith exception. The Court
announced the new Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine in Johnson
only two years before it handed down its good-faith exception decision in
Leon.270 In Leon, the Court specifically addressed the contention that the
good-faith
exception was in conflict with the Court’s new retroactivity doctrine.271
The Court succinctly declared that “nothing in Johnson precludes adoption
of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the police have
reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
but later found to be defective.”272 Similarly, the Court decided Griffith a
mere two months before it adjudicated Krull.273 Justice O’Connor, in her
dissent in Krull, even invoked Griffith, arguing that its holding was at odds
266. See Part III.A (arguing that the Leon framework supports extension of the goodfaith exception to include reliance on judicial precedent).
267. See, e.g., McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042–45 (explaining that the rationale supporting the
good-faith exception as described by the Supreme Court applies to police officer reliance on
settled case law that is invalidated after the search or seizure in question occurs).
268. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046, 1048–51 (W.D. Mich.
2009) (holding that retroactivity does not prevent consideration of the good-faith exception
to police officer reliance on invalidated judicial precedent, and then analyzing whether the
exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy to apply when a violation of Gant is found).
269. See McCane, 573 F.3d at 1045 (holding that the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to law enforcement reliance on subsequently invalidated judicial
precedent).
270. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (adopting the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule on July 5, 1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,
537 (1982) (creating the modern Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine on June 21,
1982).
271. Leon, 468 U.S. at 912 n.9.
272. Id.
273. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 340 (1987) (expanding the good-faith exception
on March 9, 1987 to include an officer’s reasonable reliance on a state statute that is later
declared unconstitutional); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (abrogating the
“clear break” exception to the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine on January 13, 1987).
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with the Court’s decision in Krull.274 The majority ignored this argument
and further expanded the scope of the good-faith exception.275 When read
together, this history makes it clear that the retroactivity doctrine should
not be considered a necessary impediment to the expansion of the goodfaith doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit put forth an alternative argument in favor of using
retroactivity to prevent an enlargement of the good-faith exception.276 In
Gonzalez, the court stated that if it were to allow the defendant’s conviction
to stand based upon evidence admitted under the good-faith exception, it
would treat the defendant differently than a similarly situated defendant
was treated in Gant, thus violating a norm of constitutional decisionmaking.277 Although it is true that Justice Harlan was concerned about
such a result in his dissent in Desist v. United States,278 which the court
cited with approval in United States v. Johnson,279 the Ninth Circuit’s
framing of the issue is misleading.
Opponents of the Ninth Circuit’s decision have argued that, in fact, the
defendants in Gant and Gonzalez were not similarly situated,280 and their
conclusion is correct. In Gant, the government never raised the argument
that the good-faith exception applied to preclude the suppression of
evidence at trial.281 Therefore, no court addressed the question of whether
the exclusionary rule was appropriately applied by conducting the costbenefit analysis required by Leon and its progeny.282 However, before the
Ninth Circuit, the government did invoke the good-faith exception, yet the
court disregarded the contention by failing to conduct the necessary
balancing test.283 The Ninth Circuit hastily glossed over this key
distinction to support its conclusion that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
doctrine compelled suppression.284
Moreover, similarly situated defendants are regularly treated differently
when circuit splits arise.285 Such a result does not necessarily indicate that
274. Krull, 480 U.S. at 368 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 352–53 (majority opinion).
276. United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).
277. Id. at 1132–33.
278. 394 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
279. 457 U.S. 537, 547–48 (1982) (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 258–59 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
280. Gonzalez II, 598 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., dissenting), denying
reh’g, 578 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).
281. Id.
282. See id. 1107–08 (recounting the fact that Gant did not address questions of
suppression and the deterrent effect it may have).
283. See Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1132 (noting that the good-faith argument was raised, but
finding that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity precedent controlled the decision of the case).
284. Id. at 1132–33.
285. Compare United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the search incident to arrest doctrine did not apply to a recent occupant of a vehicle that was
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the lower courts that have an expanded interpretation of the good-faith
exception are violating the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine. Rather,
it indicates that there is a misunderstanding as to whether the remedy
affirmed by the Supreme Court in Gant must apply to cases pending on
direct review.286 As noted above, the Supreme Court’s own rules prohibit
such a reading of Gant.287 Perhaps that is why the majority of courts facing
the issue have disagreed with the Gonzalez court’s analysis.288
Another argument in favor of finding that the retroactivity doctrine
defeats an expansion of the good-faith exception was put forth
by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Illinois v. Krull.289 Justice O’Connor
contended that applying the good-faith exception to an officer’s reasonable
reliance on an apparently valid state statute that is subsequently overturned
would remove “all incentive on the part of individual criminal defendants
to litigate the violation of their Fourth Amendment rights” because they
would not be afforded a remedy for the constitutional violation they
suffered.290 This argument essentially states that courts would be resigned
to rendering advisory opinions if the good-faith exception were to apply,
because although the courts find a constitutional violation, no remedy
would be provided for the victims of such breaches.291 Though powerful,
this contention has not found substantial support in binding precedent.292

thirty feet from the car at the time of the arrest), with United States v. Thornton, 325 F.3d
189, 194, 196 (4th Cir. 2003) (disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Strahan and
holding that officers may search a recent occupant’s vehicle incident to arrest). The
Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. See Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and holding
that police officers may search a recent occupant’s vehicle incident to arrest).
286. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1047 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and finding that the Supreme Court’s
retroactivity doctrine does not apply to prevent analysis of whether the good-faith exception
can be extended to include law enforcement reliance on settled judicial precedent that is
subsequently invalidated (citing Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 1133)).
287. See Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (explaining that Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a)
limited the Court’s ruling in Gant only to the question that was presented before the court
regarding the contours of the Fourth Amendment, not the remedy the Court affirmed).
288. Accord United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044–45 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; see, e.g., United
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine unavailing).
289. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 368–69 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
291. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 12, McCane v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1686
(2010) (No. 09-402).
292. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 n.25 (1984) (finding the argument that
the good-faith exception would take away the incentive for defendants to litigate valid
Fourth Amendment claims “unpersuasive”). When faced with a similar contention, the
Eleventh Circuit responded rather bluntly, insisting that “the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter misconduct, not to foster the development of Fourth Amendment law.” United States
v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010).
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To begin, the Supreme Court appears to have little regard for this
concern.293 In the very case in which Justice O’Connor articulated her
apprehension, the Court chose to apply the good-faith exception over her
dissent.294 Furthermore, the Court essentially ignored this argument when
it revisited the good-faith exception in the later cases of Evans and, more
recently, Herring.295 In the context of Gant violations, the Supreme Court
had the opportunity to explain that suppression would be an appropriate
remedy for convictions pending on direct appeal based on evidence
obtained in violation of the new Gant precedent, but it left the question
unaddressed.296 By applying the appropriate standard for exclusion and
reaching the conclusion that the good-faith exception applies to a police
officer’s reasonable reliance on well-settled case law that is subsequently
reversed, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits acted in accordance with the
rationale underlying the good-faith doctrine.297
Additionally, this argument incorrectly assumes that once an appellate
court decides a case and a police officer relies upon it to obtain evidence,
the good-faith exception will always preclude operation of the exclusionary
rule at trial.298 The Supreme Court has always required a police officer’s
reliance, whether it is on a search warrant or state statute, to be objectively
reasonable.299 In situations where the precedent has not been thoroughly
vetted on appeal or the rule on which the police relied was ambiguous, the
defense retains its ability to effectively argue that a police officer’s reliance
upon the decision was unreasonable.300

293. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924 n. 25.
294. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50.
295. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699, 704 (2009) (accepting the
assumption that the search of the petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but
affording him no remedy because the good-faith exception precluded exclusion); Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1995) (holding that although the search of the defendant violated
the Fourth Amendment, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule prevented
suppression of the evidence obtained from that search); Leon, 468 U.S. at 926 (holding that
objectively reasonable reliance on a facially valid search warrant that is later deemed
deficient operates to prevent application of the exclusionary rule).
296. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1045 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010) (finding that the Supreme Court’s retroactivity
requirements only demand application of the rule specifically declared in Gant, not the
remedy of the lower court that the Supreme Court affirmed).
297. See id. at 1042–45 (analyzing the rationale of the good-faith exception and applying
it to hold that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule includes reasonable law
enforcement reliance on case law that is later overturned).
298. Cf. Gonzalez II, 598 F.3d 1095, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he existence of a relevant court case supporting an officer’s search does not
automatically prove he was acting in good faith where that case is later overruled. A police
officer must still prove that his reliance was objectively reasonable.”) denying reh’g, 578
F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).
299. Id. at 1107.
300. See id. at 1106–07 (noting that the good-faith exception is not applied
automatically).
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Furthermore, this argument goes so far as to assume that even in novel
cases, criminal defendants and their attorneys will have the foresight to
predict with certainty the outcome of their particular case before the trial
and appellate courts, therefore dissuading them from pursuing their
constitutional claims. But, this cannot be the rational approach. Due
process requires that for each novel issue a court hears, it must do so with
the possibility of finding in favor of the defendant.301 A criminal defendant
brought to trial would be far more rational in pursuing a vindication of her
Fourth Amendment rights before that body than failing to raise the issue,
thus precluding any possibility of a beneficial outcome before that
tribunal.302 Should such a claim fail, the rational defendant would opt to
pursue review of the losing claim before an appellate court rather than
squander such an opportunity by resigning herself to defeat at the trial
level. Because there is always a chance that the higher courts may side
with the defendant on a novel claim, the incentive to litigate Fourth
Amendment violations remains intact.303 Therefore, the concerns about the
good-faith exception destroying any possibility that a defendant will retain
the benefit of the exclusionary rule in the context of an officer’s reasonable
reliance on case law are unwarranted.
Although critics of the expanded good-faith exception rely, primarily, on
the Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine, this approach ignores the
importance of the Court’s equally long-standing good-faith doctrine.304 So
long as the exclusionary rule is understood to operate only as a last resort to
deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment,305 admitting evidence
obtained in good-faith reliance on settled case law that is subsequently
invalidated is justified. If courts were to suppress such evidence, they
would do so to the detriment of both society and the criminal justice
system.306 Those who argue that admitting the evidence would violate
301. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (“It is
axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’”
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))).
302. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 354 (1987) (explaining that “‘the magnitude of
the benefit conferred on defendants by a successful [suppression] motion makes it unlikely
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished’” (quoting United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S 897, 924 n.25 (1984))).
303. See supra note 295 (noting that due process requires a fair tribunal).
304. See People v. Branner, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 256, 267 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the good-faith exception is as important as the
Supreme Court’s retroactivity doctrine), review granted, 227 P.3d 342 (2010).
305. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.
306. Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (explaining that the costs
associated with a dogmatic application of the exclusionary rule, such as impeding the truthfinding functions of the courts and letting some guilty defendants go free, “have long been a
source of concern” for the Court). The Court also noted that when a police officer acts in
good faith but commits a minor infraction, an inflexible approach to the exclusionary rule
would confer a higher magnitude of benefits to an otherwise guilty defendant. Id. at 908.
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basic norms of constitutional adjudication overlook the fact that
suppressing the evidence would offend basic concepts of justice underlying
the entire judicial system’s operation.307
CONCLUSION
The costs society is forced to bear when inherently trustworthy physical
evidence is excluded from trial are substantial.308 That is why application
of the exclusionary rule is only appropriate when the benefits it provides in
terms of deterring future constitutional violations outweigh its
accompanying costs.309 When a court lets an otherwise guilty defendant go
free, it jeopardizes the integrity of the entire judicial system.310 Because
these institutions possess only as much power as society is willing to
attribute them, anything that casts doubt on the courts’ decision-making
processes cannot be healthy for the rule of law.311 That is why courts
should work to reduce public perceptions of judicial impropriety at every
turn. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is a rational
response to this dilemma.
The framework set forth in Leon clearly supports the expansion of the
good-faith exception to include a police officer’s objectively reasonable
reliance on a well-settled and unambiguous decision of an appellate court
that is later reversed.312 As the Supreme Court declared, the exclusionary
rule “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively
reasonable law enforcement activity.”313 Yet, if courts were to adopt the
exclusionary rule in this context, they would be attempting to do just that.
When police officers conform their conduct to the law as announced by the
courts within their jurisdiction, they are doing precisely what society
expects of them, thus making their actions reasonable.314 An expanded

307. Id.
308. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–01 (2009) (providing examples of
the costs associated with the exclusion of incriminating evidence at trial (citing Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987))).
309. Id. at 700.
310. Id. at 701 (citing Leon, 480 U.S. at 908).
311. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The
Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows
itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law
means and to declare what it demands.”).
312. Cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1995) (reviewing the rationale supporting
the good-faith exception in Leon and applying it to find that the exception encompasses a
law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on the negligent mistake of judicial
employees); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347–53 (1987) (appropriating the reasoning of
Leon to hold that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated state statute precluded the application of the exclusionary rule).
313. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).
314. See United States v. Owens, No. 5:09-cr-14/RS, 2009 WL 2584570, at *3 (“Relying
upon settled case law is objectively reasonable law enforcement behavior.”).
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good-faith exception recognizes this incongruity, and prevents the
operation of the exclusionary rule when it would only work to harm
society.
Some courts, however, have rejected an expansion of the good-faith
exception out of fear that it would conflict with the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment retroactivity doctrine.315 These courts read an
importance into the retroactivity doctrine that ignores the fundamental
interests served by the current formulation of the good-faith exception.316
Furthermore, they misunderstand how the retroactivity doctrine operates.317
Ever since the Supreme Court adopted the good-faith exception, it has
carefully explained that questions of law must be separated from questions
of remedy.318 The courts that mechanically apply remedies not specifically
addressed in the Supreme Court’s rulings do so in error.319 Therefore,
courts should continue to adopt the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in situations where a police officer reasonably relies on
the settled case law of the jurisdiction in which the officer acts.

315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
319. See United States v. Peoples, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046 (W.D. Mich. 2009)
(explaining that the Supreme Court’s rules require only the retroactive application of the
constitutional rule announced in Gant not the remedy that the Court affirmed).

